The convergence of governance: upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world and downgrading democracy elsewhere? by Cavatorta, Francesco
1 
The Convergence of Governance: Upgrading Authoritarianism in 
the Arab World and Downgrading Democracy Elsewhere?  
 
FRANCESCO CAVATORTA 
School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Glasnevin, Dublin, Ireland 
  
 
In a sobering 2002 article, Thomas Carothers debunked many of the notions surrounding the 
validity of the democratization paradigm and illustrated the problems that emerge with 
studying political change in authoritarian contexts only through the prism of transitology.1 
Questioning the validity of the democratization paradigm carries significant weight in the case 
of the Arab world where no formal transition to democracy has occurred. Building on 
Carothers, there have been works attempting to abandon the assumptions of the 
democratization paradigm, focusing instead on the daily reality of governance in the region 
and how it is practiced. These studies have been grouped under the label of post-
democratization and have examined different aspects of the persistence of authoritarianism, as 
Morten Valbjørn and André Bank stated in the introduction to this special issue. This has led 
to a renewed interest in forms of governance that are on a continuum from authoritarianism to 
democracy rather than looking at the continuum as a path whereby countries are inevitably on 
the move toward the ‘end of history.’2
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 This is due to the liberalizations that occurred in the 
Arab world over the last two decades. Thus, the concept of semi-democracy has been applied 
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to the Arab world, where it has taken the label of ‘liberalized autocracy.’3
 This study argues against both democracy-spotting and exceptionalism, contending 
instead that the region displays a form of governance that has become quite widespread across 
the globe with a number of different political systems and regimes displaying similar 
dynamics. In short, liberal-authoritarian forms of rule are part of a general trend. More 
specifically, this analysis argues that the increasing de-politicisation of the citizenry across 
political systems is generating a normatively worrying trend of ‘convergence of governance.’ 
Thus, traditional authoritarian systems change and survive by adopting ad hoc liberal reforms 
and some democratic institutions, while democracies experience a considerable weakening of 
their institutions and adopt fundamentally un-democratic and illiberal policies such as the 
widespread use of mechanisms of surveillance of citizens.
 The problem with 
such studies, however, is that they reinforce paradoxically the notion of an exceptional Arab 
world when it comes to its form of political rule because they tend to lack a broad 
comparative dimension, as if the Arabs were somewhat unique in experiencing a form of 
political rule that mixes leadership’s unaccountability, arbitrary power, and a degree of 
political and economic liberalism.  
4
 De-politicisation, understood as public apathy and detachment from institutional 
politics, is a characteristic often associated with liberal-democracies where the participation of 
citizens has been diminishing for decades, leading some to argue that the core features of 
democracy are weakening.
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therefore rather than authoritarian regimes converging toward democracy, we might be 
witnessing a double movement whereby both democratic and authoritarian regimes are 
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moving toward a system of governance where de-politicisation is the norm, real policy-
making power is concentrated in a few hands, democratic institutions are not truly responsive 
and where the only difference between countries is the degree of protection for liberal rights. 
In this context the ‘authoritarian upgrading’6
 Going back in time to the pre demo-crazy era – or what Valbjørn and Bank in this 
issue coin as ‘the first era of post-democratization’ – can provide useful tools of analysis to 
explain this development. The insights of Marxism and in particular the political economy 
literature dealing with structural power can offer a convincing explanatory framework. In 
short, the shrinking of the state has negative political effects on the attachment of ordinary 
citizens to its institutions and to political participation across different national political 
systems, be they democratic or authoritarian.  
 occurring in the Arab world is parallel to the 
‘democratic downgrading’ in democracies. The article does not argue that that political life in 
authoritarian and democratic systems is the same, but it contends that there is a trend toward 
the convergence of governance with similar policies and mechanisms of decision-making.  
 
Upgraded Authoritarianism in the Arab World . . .  
During the demo-crazy years, the Arab world stood out as an exception to the democratizing 
trend. The persistence of authoritarianism, however, did not stop scholars from analyzing 
changes in the region as potential or real steps toward democratization, with the liberal 
reforms undertaken by Arab regimes deemed to increase the prospects of their 
democratization. For example, the growth of civil society activism was hailed as the 
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‘democratic ingredient’ that would deliver the Arabs from authoritarianism.7
 This demo-crazy enthusiasm today largely has subsided and, following Lisa 
Anderson’s advice, scholars tend to study the mechanisms through which current Arab rulers 
have managed to maintain power.
 Much of the 
same can be said about elections in the region, which often were defined as watershed 
founding moments in the democratization process. Finally, liberal economic reforms 
introduced throughout the 1990s also were hailed as having the potential to kick-start political 
democratization because they would provide a prominent democratizing role for the middle 
classes.  
8 Thus, at closer scrutiny, it emerges that civil society 
activism in the Arab world is not the liberating force it was believed to be, but another 
instrument of control on the part of authoritarian elites over society.9 Also, while there is no 
doubt that elections in the Arab world occur more regularly and fairly than in the past, they do 
not give elected representatives any significant policy-making power and are designed to 
confirm incumbents.10 The example of the 2007 Moroccan elections highlights how they did 
not represent a major turning point for the country, but simply another instrument the 
monarchy uses to strengthen its position.11
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name of rule of law and political pluralism, have reinforced corrupt networks of patronage in 
which new economic elites linked to the authoritarian state apparatus derive significant 
rents.12
 The literature therefore has oscillated from democracy-spotting to studying 
authoritarian persistence. However, the current focus on the authoritarian reality of the Arab 
world should not obscure the fact that real political, economic and social changes have 
occurred in the region with a significant impact on governance, suggesting that there have 
been many changes within the continuity.
  
13  Thus, while political rule has remained 
essentially authoritarian, the social coalitions supporting the regimes and the economic and 
social structures and the means through which the ruling elites control their countries have 
changed significantly. Paradoxically, the thread of all these changes is the introduction of 
liberal reforms. As Heydemann points out, ‘Arab regimes have conceded the commanding 
heights of authoritarian rule, opened limited space for civil societies, permitted opposition 
parties to operate more freely, broadened press freedoms, and acknowledged the legitimacy of 
human rights.’14
 In 1997 Fareed Zakaria argued that we were witnessing the rise of illiberal 
democracies, a form on government of successful ‘dysfunctional equilibrium’ where 
 This indicates that political rule has shifted away from traditional forms of 
authoritarianism. More crucially, the way in which authoritarian regimes in the region 
transformed themselves while retaining an authoritarian core points to the fact that Arab 
regimes are not ‘exceptional’ because there is a generalized move towards liberal 
authoritarianism across the globe. 
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constitutional liberalism is marginalized and mechanic democratic procedures take center 
stage.15 The concept of illiberal democracy suffers from a number of theoretical problems,16
 The starting point of this study is the hypothesis that the expected convergence toward 
a liberal-democratic model might not occur because of the weakening of liberal-democracy 
itself over the last few decades. This might then point to a different future convergence.
 
but in the Arab context it was updated in Brumberg’s definition of ‘liberalized autocracy,’ 
which is suited better to describe Arab political systems. Such systems display a degree of 
pluralism and liberal rights, although the core of political power is out of reach and 
unaccountable, rendering many of these liberal rights quite meaningless. Thus, as mentioned 
above, what we have to contend with is a ‘new’ political system that currently is studied in its 
own right. While it is certainly a worthwhile enterprise to discover the ways in which Arab 
regimes have been able to survive in power through the introduction of both political and 
economic liberal measures, there is an absence of comparative work on how such reforms fit 
in with political developments outside the region and, more precisely, in established and new 
democracies where significant changes also have occurred over the last few decades. By 
taking a broader comparative perspective, what emerges is a complex picture of the shifting 
nature of governance in both democracies and authoritarian systems.  
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decisions are removed from popular and democratic decision-making. The most significant 
and visible trait that both systems of government are displaying at the moment is the de-
 
16  Jørgen Møller (2008) ‘A Critical Note on the Rise of Illiberal Democracy,’ Australian 
Journal of Political Science, 43, 3, pp. 555–561.  
 
17  Olivier Dabène, Vincent Geissier & Gilles Massardier (eds.) (2008), Autoritarismes 
Démocratiques et Démocraties Autoritaires au XXIe Siècle (Paris: La Découverte).  
7 
politicisation of citizens. By this, ordinary citizens no longer actively participate in forms of 
institutional politics such as elections or membership of political parties and simply opt out. 
This does not mean that citizens do not engage in other forms of political engagement; it 
simply indicates that the institutions of the state are no longer the forum where politics takes 
place. 
 De-politicization is a core feature of authoritarianism and is to be expected in semi-
authoritarian systems.18 Thus, while the ability to enjoy a degree of liberal rights is a welcome 
development in Arab polities, the inability to have a voice in the political system saps the 
enthusiasm with which the liberal reforms are received because the decisions taken do not 
reflect what might be considered an emerging popular will. The scope of reforms in the Arab 
world has changed many of the aspects of traditional authoritarianism and permitted a greater 
space for society without, however, modifying the nature of decision-making at the highest 
levels of government. This has produced a society where ‘change’ is quite visible and where 
the exterior signs of modernity are present, but where meaningful accountability is absent. For 
instance, the opening up of civil society space has guaranteed new individual liberal rights to 
some social groups such as women, as Julie Pruzan Jørgensen highlights in her contribution to 
this special issue. Also, the crass intimidation of journalists and the monopoly on information 
to a large extent has ceased, and, while there are still cases of journalists being severely 
harassed, the press is generally freer and there is increased access to information from a range 
of different media with important repercussion on how issues are debated.19
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 At the same time, 
however, institutional reforms in favor of accountability have not occurred, and this 
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undermines fundamentally the liberal reforms undertaken because democracy understood as 
the sovereignty, however partial, of citizens on political decisions concerning the whole polity 
is absent. The inability to have meaningful access and the sentiment that liberal reforms do 
not truly equate with genuine change de-politicize the citizenry, which ultimately switches off 
from political engagement and either refrains from participating or finds alternative ways of 
engaging that might be less overtly political. It is this retreat from politics rather than the 
massive use of repression that helps the rulers of liberalized autocracies to remain in power 
because they have obtained the de-structuration of society and perpetuated their power as a 
consequence.  
 Examples of de-politicization from the Arab world abound. The 2007 Moroccan 
legislative elections saw a historically low turnout of 37 percent and one-fifth of the votes cast 
were spoiled purposefully.20 The 2009 Algerian presidential elections, despite their ostensible 
multi-candidate nature, did not draw the 72 percent turnout that the Minister of Interior 
claimed.21 The same findings can be generalised across the Arab world when it comes to 
elections, as ordinary citizens do not perceive them to be as historic as the rulers claim.22
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addition to low electoral participation, another potent sign of de-politicization is the retreat of 
citizens to civil society activism. Across the Arab world, civil society activism has become 
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The vast majority of organisations are concerned only marginally with openly political issues 
and even the ones that have a political motivation are usually single-issue associations 
focusing on narrow themes such as human rights. The absence of open political and 
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institutional participation indicates that there is a strong degree of dissatisfaction and lack of 
confidence in public institutions and political parties, with corruption topping the list of public 
problems in Arab states.23 Significantly, as the Moroccan case demonstrates, even Islamist 
parties are beginning to suffer from supporters’ disenchantment. A further indication of the 
de-politicisation of society is, paradoxically, the periodic recourse of regimes to street politics 
and demonstrations on sensitive foreign policy issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
when ordinary citizens are allowed to express their views in bursts of outrage that, however, 
do not lead to any practical measure. On top of the inability to influence decision-making 
genuinely through routinized channels despite the formal existence of representative 
institutions, the vast majority of citizens have to contend with the de-structuration and 
pauperisation of society that market reforms have caused. The hijacking of economic reforms 
on the part of those connected to the regime has led to an increase in inequality and to 
significant political shifts.24 The economic and social displacement that the radical changes in 
the mechanics of production and distribution produced have been devastating for the majority 
of Arab citizens, with regimes largely unable and unwilling to deal with the consequences of 
this.25
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are at the mercy of global forces over which they have no control, increasing the ‘distance’ 
between rulers and ruled. This widespread de-politicization has allowed current Arab rulers to 
remain in power while also presenting a façade of successful ongoing democratization.  
 The de-politicization occurring in the Arab world is, for some, a temporary 
phenomenon linked to the stalling of reforms and therefore the success of liberalized 
autocracy is limited in time. Such scholars still hold that ‘the proposition that autocracies have 
achieved a new lease on life and are emerging today as a viable alternative…is wrong.’26 
They still believe that there will be a convergence of these regimes toward the established and 
dominant liberal democracies, but they fail to take into account the de-structuration and de-
politicization of society that have become key features of democracies, making them not only 
less ‘democratic,’ but also less appealing as models. The transformation of governance in the 
authoritarian Arab world has occurred in parallel with the transformation of governance in 
democracies, suggesting that the semi-authoritarian limbo might not be temporary, as other 
countries are converging toward that. As van Kersbergen states, ‘on the one hand…we have 
witnessed the increasing esteem, legitimacy, and triumph of democracy as a regime 
throughout the world, while, on the other hand, we have been observing an increasing 
dissatisfaction with politics, and the loss of confidence in the performance of government in 
new and established democracies.’27
 The de-politicization of the polity is one of the reasons why liberalized autocracies 
survive. It follows that the teleology of democratization comes into doubt, as such de-
politicization is not confined to the Arab world or liberalised autocracies; it is also a defining 
trait of liberal democracies. It is at this juncture that the argument of convergence of 
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governance toward liberal-democracy or ‘the end of history’ falters. Thus, the current 
governance practices in the Arab world might be the future of governance for a number, if not 
all, of today’s liberal-democratic regimes.  
 
… Downgraded Democracy Elsewhere 
The phenomenon of de-politicization is a significant development of political life in liberal 
democracies. More specifically, there are four manifestations of it that are parallel to 
developments in Arab liberalised autocracies. The first one is the decreasing turnout at 
elections. This mirrors the lack of enthusiasm of voters in the Arab world, with citizens 
seemingly accepting that elections are increasingly irrelevant. While some do not see this as 
problematic, the scale and the reasons behind decreasing turnout affect the legitimacy of the 
system. First of all, a higher turnout might modify the final outcome of elections because 
some social groups have a much higher degree of apathy than others, leading to the over-
representation of specific political issues and pressure groups. Secondly decreasing turnout 
stains the legitimacy of elections if absenteeism becomes the norm and increases over time. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, turnout for the legislative elections went from 78.8 
percent in 1974 to 75.3 percent in 1987 to 71.5 percent in 1992 to 61.5 percent in 2005 and 
finally to 65 percent in 2010. This downward trend is unequivocal for all democracies. While 
an argument could be made that these numbers reflect the ‘habit’ of democracy and therefore 
its consolidation, this cannot account for very low turnout figures in recent democracies 
where the ‘thirst’ for participation should be at peak levels, given the previous inability to cast 
meaningful votes under authoritarian rule. There are certainly cases of new democracies 
where the enthusiasm for politics is still manifested in high turnouts, but we have many more 
12 
cases where this is not the case.28 The downward trend of turnout across new and established 
democracies is particularly worrying because it no longer is confined to the ‘usual suspects’ 
who never turned out, but it is affecting an increasing number of citizens. As Diamanti claims, 
‘today’s voter needs good reasons to vote for a party or a candidate, as the time of the loyal 
voter is over. However, before all that, he needs good reasons to actually turn out,’29 and such 
reasons seem to be missing today. This sentiment echoes what ordinary Arab voters 
experience when the system asks them to cast their ballots. Finally, turning out, in both 
democratic and authoritarian settings, increasingly has become a function of personal 
advantages that voters expect to obtain from elected representatives: voting is used to access 
patronage networks and in exchange for personal benefits. Ellen Lust, for example, amply 
illustrates this aspect of voting in her study of elections in Jordan,30 as does Roberto Saviano 
in his analysis of voting behavior in the south of Italy.31
 The second indicator of de-politicization is the widespread low confidence of citizens 
in public institutions. As van Kersbergen highlights, ‘all well established and new 
democracies are confronted with increasing dissatisfaction and disillusionment with 
politics.’
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society, including political parties, parliaments, executives, and trade unions. For example, in 
a recent continent-wide survey, AmericasBarometer measured the trust of citizens in political 
parties and the results demonstrated how low the average level of trust in political parties is in 
every single country.33 Similar results have emerged in European surveys and find a parallel 
with the disenchantment of Arab citizens with their own political parties, including, in some 
cases, Islamist ones. More generally Hay details the net levels of trust in public institutions in 
the United States and the European Union and the results demonstrate how little trust political 
parties, national governments, and legislatures actually enjoy.34
 A third trend has to do with the quality of information that citizens receive and how 
the information is processed. Citizens in liberal democracies enjoy freedom of information 
and have access to an almost unlimited amount of media. They therefore are exposed to an 
enormous mass of information and should be able to make informed political decisions. 
However, the amount of information is not necessarily linked to quality, and ordinary citizens 
easily can be manipulated and misinformed. The media debacle over the weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq in 2003 is only the most visible example of the wide gap between the 
amount of information, the quality of it and the ability and time of citizens to process such 
information, illustrating again the validity of the theory of ‘manufacturing consent.’
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Technology now makes the ‘same information’ available to a world wide audience, and in the 
Arab world the development of the internet and satellite television provides ordinary citizens 
with such information. The problem with the quality of it remains and it is the mechanisms of 
packaging such information that is crucial. Much like in democracies and despite the presence 
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of trans-Arab channels such as Al Jazeera, large media conglomerates are very close to ruling 
elites, have to be mindful of the imperative of profitability, and rely overwhelmingly on 
government and corporate sources for information. The recent media liberalization in Tunisia, 
for instance, gives the impression of pluralism, but members of the president own family or 
close beneficiaries of economic patronage networks own and control the newly licensed 
private TV and radio networks.36
 It is interesting to note that in earlier times it was political parties in democracies that 
packaged information and presented it to citizens. While the information was certainly 
partisan, citizens were not alone in the face of it because there was a wider ideological context 
which would make sense of a complex reality, and authoritarian systems provided unifying 
narratives. With the diminishing trust in political parties, media and politicians, this 
mechanism of transmission of information does not exist any longer. We therefore now 
witness, for instance, the presidentialization of politics, even in parliamentary systems where 
the attention is concentrated on the leader and his personality and ‘likability.’ This does not 
mean that the whole citizenry is poorly informed and makes choices simply based on how 
likeable a candidate is, but the increasing attention on the personality of candidates and 
leaders rather than on issues is a new development that we need to consider.  
 The mechanisms of information therefore are broadly 
similar across systems, but knowledge seems no longer to matter.  
 Where information is poor, the personalization of politics occurs more frequently, 
coupled with another perception: the idea that a single leader will be able to ‘put the country 
right.’ This has led to a dramatic increase in populism, driven by a focus on personality rather 
than policies. As David Adams argued when analysing the 2010 British parliamentary 
elections, ‘style and presentation have of course always mattered in politics, but only as 
complementary to policy. These factors have never almost completely excluded politics, as is 
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happening now. Perhaps nowadays we hold politicians in such low regard, considering them 
to be, without exception, such complete charlatans that rather than spend time listening to 
what any of them has to say, many of us simply plump for the one we consider to be the most 
presentable and/or likeable liar. Either that, or we choose to opt out of politics altogether.’37 
This new development compounds the problem of low turnout at elections because 
paradoxically ‘it’s hard to know whether to be more concerned about growing numbers of 
people not bothering to vote, or about what might be visited upon us at some stage by those 
who still do.’38 This focus on leadership and ‘leaders’ embodying the people in democracies is 
reminiscent of the way in which Arab leaders portray themselves in the public sphere, where 
policies should not be a concern of citizens because the leader ultimately will decide in the 
people’s interest. Concentrating on the quality of the leader and his personal traits also has 
meant an increasing role for ‘first ladies,’ who are trotted out in public to point to a 
character’s traits that are used to create a PR-packaged image of the leader, further reducing 
the focus on policies. A very similar phenomenon is occurring in the Arab world, where both 
princesses and first ladies have become public figures active in civil society activism and 
providing a more modern image of the leader among key social constituencies.39
 Finally, de-politicization is also evident in the retreat of many to civil society activism. 
While there is a considerable literature linking civil society activism with the strengthening of 
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democracy,40 a different take on such activism is also possible. Within democratic theory, 
civil society positively is linked to democracy. The civic activism of citizens is supposed to 
make individuals ‘practice’ democracy, and associational life therefore sustains democratic 
institutions and democratic legitimacy. The problem with this assumption is that it neglects to 
consider the side effects of such activism on the political system, which can be hijacked by 
special interests, rendering it less rather than more democratic. In addition, certain forms of 
civil society activism constitute a retreat to forms of private engagement where single-issues 
organisations and their members are active only in so far as the issue remains important or 
some specific objective is achieved, as the ‘not-in-my backyard’ phenomenon indicates. This 
type of activism clashes with more general political engagement because civil society seeks a 
‘voice’ not necessarily ‘choice.’ This means that associations tend largely to become 
interlocutors with public institutions in order to achieve a very specific goal and once they are 
successful, their job is done. To do this they are interested in their mandate only and seek 
access to public authorities for ‘selfish’ reasons. If all associations behave in the same 
manner, the outcome is not democratic confrontation, but an attempt to corner a ‘market’ 
where the association becomes the monopolist. Similar dynamics are in place in the 
authoritarian Arab world, where the rise in civil society activism constitutes both a failure of 
traditional party politics41 and a means through which the different regimes can control 
society.42
                                                          
40  Robert Putnam (2000), Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community 
(New York: Simon & Schuster).  
  
 
41  Vickie Langohr (2004), ‘Too much civil society, too little politics: Egypt and liberalising 
Arab regimes,’ Comparative Politics, 36, 2, pp. 181–204. 
  
42  Quintan Wiktorowicz (2000), ‘Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan,’ 
Comparative Politics, 33, 1, pp. 43–61. 
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 It should be noted that some analysts do not perceive these trends as problematic,43
 From this picture it emerges that a similar disenchantment of citizens toward the state, 
public representatives and political institutions affects both liberal-democracies and 
liberalized autocracies. This is, however, not the only similarity between the two systems of 
government. Much like democracies are afflicted by diseases that are normally associated 
with de-structured societies governed through arbitrary norms, liberalized autocracies display 
traits and characteristics that one would normally associate with democratic governments. 
There are two of these that seem particularly significant. First of all, liberalized autocracies 
are qualitatively different from the ideal type of dictatorships where the dictator is solely in 
charge. Liberalized autocracies are successful because they are not like that; quite the contrary 
they derive legitimacy and support from a wide range of social groups and the ability to 
deliver material and ‘moral’ resources to such groups empowers them and enables them to 
 
while others go as far as to argue that a permanently mobilized citizenry is detrimental to 
democratic decision-making because it would cause too much stress on the political 
institutions. This view might be procedurally correct in the sense that apathy and low 
participation do not necessarily invalidate the results of elections. However, if one takes a 
more substantive definition of democratic governance, the absence of widespread support for 
the system or the belief that individual citizens cannot have a meaningful say in decision-
making fundamentally weakens the democratic covenant. Finally, if one perceives democratic 
institutions simply as loci to be penetrated to obtain advantages for a specific goal limited in 
time, the credibility of democracy as a set of practices to determine the common good 
diminishes considerably.  
                                                          
43  Eoin O’Malley (2008), ‘Turn Out to Turf Out?: Effects of Changes in Election 
Participation Rates on Election Outcomes,’ The Open Political Science Journal, 1, 1, pp. 
31–37.  
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survive.44
 
 Secondly, public opinion plays a role in decision-making in the liberalized 
autocracies through a number of informal channels that convey to the leadership the type of 
choices that citizens largely will tolerate and the ones that are to be wholly rejected wholly. In 
conclusion, there is a pattern of convergence at play between liberalized autocracies and 
established democracies, but they are not converging where Fukuyama expected. 
Marxist Neo-Dependencia 
Van Kersbergen acknowledges that ‘the explanations for the disquieting reality in functioning 
democracies are manifold’45
 Building on the literature about the ‘death of partisanship,’ a significant part of the 
explanation for this path toward the convergence of governance between liberalized 
autocracies and liberal democracies has to do with the acceleration of capitalist globalization 
that places all states under severe constraints. In its original enunciation the death of 
partisanship related to the idea that that ‘rising levels of trade integration and capital 
mobility…combined with the increasing leverage of the international financial institutions 
significantly constrained the preferences of domestic actors,’
 just like a number of authors emphasize the multiple reasons why 
a similar, and perhaps more justifiable, dissatisfaction with politics exists in the Arab world. 
A number of works focus on the inadequacies of citizens themselves to take advantage of 
political opportunities. This might be partly true in democracies, but it is less so in the case of 
Arab regimes, although citizens in these states are also not immune from academic criticism 
usually in the form of culturalist arguments.  
46
                                                          
44  Raymond Hinnebusch (2006), ‘Authoritarian persistence, democratization theory and the 
Middle East: An Overview and Critique,’ Democratization, 13, 3, pp. 373–395.  
 therefore leading parties of the 
 
45  Kersbergen, ‘Quasi-Messianism,’ p. 37. 
  
46  David Doyle (2009), ‘Pressure to Privatize? The IMF, Globalisation and partisanship in 
Latin America,’ unpublished paper, p. 1. 
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left and the right to adopt similar economic policies converging toward a neo-liberal 
economic model. While the inevitability of neo-liberal convergence is still under dispute, 
there is a considerable degree of consensus on the fact that the trend is very much one of the 
state’s retreat from economic policy-making.47 Although the literature focuses its attention on 
international pressures in the economic sphere with regard to decisions such as privatizations, 
tight fiscal policies, budgetary cuts, or measures to increase foreign direct investments, these 
international pressures linked to the development of capitalism also have a number of 
consequences that alter the political systems of all states, whether authoritarian or 
democratic.48
 The Marxist informed dependencia theory of the 1970s, a largely forgotten approach 
in the early studies of globalization, is a useful framework when one examines the effects of 
the international capitalist system on domestic political structures. Adapting this approach to 
current political systems can shed some light on how the international and the domestic 
interact across different systems of government in order to move away from the exclusive 
focus on the absence of democracy and the persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world 
and instead to account for the changes that have occurred in a much broader perspective. 
When stripped of its most ideological elements, ‘dependency theory created a framework for 
analysis of Latin American political economy that invited the consideration of external factors 
 This means that we need to understand political systems outside the simplistic 
dichotomy of democracy and authoritarianism along a nice laid out path that takes countries 
from the latter to the former and instead we need to focus on attempting to account for the 
emergence of similar phenomena such as the ones under the rubric of de-politicization that 
affect all states and systems.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
  
47  Susan Strange (1996), The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
  
48  Adam Przeworski & Michael Wallerstein (1988), ‘Structural Dependence of the State on 
Capital,’ American Political Science Review, 83, 1, pp. 11–29. 
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as well as internal ones,’49 and starting from this premise it gave a prominent role to the 
capitalist economy in determining the fate of Latin American domestic politics. There are 
certainly a number of problems with dependency theory, but some of its assumptions need to 
be re-examined today. For example, it assumed the international capitalist structure forced a 
specific type of economic development in Latin America that required authoritarian political 
structures particularly because the needs of the bourgeoisie in Latin America only could be 
satisfied through authoritarian practices. Today’s neo-dependecia, drawing more heavily from 
classical Marxism, is somewhat different because it not only addresses specific regional 
dynamics but also deals with more issues than simply underdevelopment. Instead it seeks to 
speak to the issue of de-politicization and convergence of governance. The argument is that 
the international political economy, structured around neo-liberal economics, places similar 
pressures on all national governments, which react to these structural pressures similarly 
although they have different degrees of capabilities to deal with such pressures. Despite these 
different capabilities, all national governments seem to have succumbed to the requirements 
of globalization, leaving very little room to manoeuvre for national policy-makers to try out 
alternative economic policies to deal with the increased ‘vulnerability’ of citizens exposed to 
the full force of globalization.50
                                                          
49  David Moles (1999), ‘Dependencia and Modernization,’ pp. 1–8, available at: 
 As mentioned above, however, pressures from ‘outside’ not 
only occur in the economic sphere, but also have consequences for the political institutions in 
place as well and the way in which ordinary citizens relate to them, because economic 
globalization comes with a collection of other challenges to the state that go beyond 
economics, such as migration or cultural ‘contamination.’ The challenges that states face 
therefore are, as Hinnebusch also demonstrates in his contribution to this special issue, 
http://www.chrononaut.org/~dm/papers/dependencia.pdf; accessed 10 April 2010.  
 
50  Peadar Kirby (2006), ‘Theorising globalisation’s social impact: Proposing the concept of 
vulnerability,’ Review of International Political Economy, 13, 4, pp. 632–655.  
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‘universal state building challenges.’ More specifically there are three reasons that contribute 
to explain how neo-dependencia strains all political systems irrespective of the nature of 
political rule, making them converge over time.  
 First of all is the sentiment that ordinary citizens have of being deprived of any 
decision-making power regarding significant decisions related to economic policies and re-
distribution, which also affect a number of other policy areas because of economic 
externalities, including the state of public services or migration. The privation of clear 
decision-making power is due to both the nature of the international capitalist system and the 
pressure that leading actors in the system, including supranational organisations, apply. The 
leading powers in the international system push an agenda that reflects their narrow national 
interests, although they also suffer from structural constraints, leading to the manifestation of 
similar symptoms of de-politicization found in less powerful countries. With respect to 
supranational organisations, people perceive them to be taking binding decisions that 
countries must abide by despite the potential opposition of the vast majority of citizens who 
then feel that they have no say in how their state’s affairs should be run.51
                                                          
51  Ngaire Woods (2001), ‘IMF and World Bank: Questions of accountability,’ International 
Affairs, 77, 1, pp. 83–100. 
 This is the 
‘democratic deficit’ problem that most international organisations suffer from, although some 
scholars argue that such a deficit does not actually exist. Ultimately however the existence or 
absence of a democratic deficit is irrelevant, because what matters is the perception of its 
existence. Accordingly, what one has to investigate is how citizens perceive the procedures of 
decision-making that they have. In the last instance the fact that many ruling governments, be 
they democratic or not, utilize international organisations as scapegoats for decisions that they 
want to make but know are not popular does not invalidate the argument. In this case as well 
the de-politicization and absence of trust in public institutions are the outcome. This is highly 
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problematic because it seems to point to the idea that the very entity ‘state,’ including the 
democratic state,52
 Second is the problem of increasing inequalities that the neo-liberal economic system 
has created.
 is ill-suited to deal with the challenges of globalization.  
53 Rightly or wrongly, democracies traditionally have been associated with the 
necessity of decreasing inequalities either because of the mechanisms of decision-making 
which in theory involve all social groups or because of the in-built notion of equality that they 
have. However, income inequalities and inequalities in life-styles have been increasing on an 
unparalleled scale over the last three decades. This is problematic because it makes the 
political system responsible for addressing such inequalities that undermine access to political 
participation. When the system does not respond because the structure of the global economic 
pressures prevents it, the system as a whole loses credibility. In authoritarian regimes 
economic and social inequalities are believed to be in-built because in order to stay in power 
ruling elites have to privilege patterns of patronage that undermine any notion of equality, 
political or otherwise, but in democracies this is not perceived as being the case. In any case, 
the growth of income inequalities breeds both apathy and ‘revolutionary’ anger and, more 
significantly, it undermines the legitimacy of public representatives insofar as they are held to 
be colluding with powerful economic interests to the detriment of citizens.54
                                                          
52  Benjamin Barber (2000), ‘Can Democracy Survive Globalisation?,’ Government and 
Opposition, 35, 3, pp. 277–301. 
 The innumerable 
and recent financial and banking scandals certainly have highlighted how the issue of 
patronage and incestuous links between political and economic elites is not confined to 
authoritarian systems, but affects liberal-democracies as well.  The concept of crony 
capitalism seems to capture the nature of the collusion between business and politics well in 
both systems. The checks and balances that were in place in liberal-democracies to prevent 
  
53  Joseph Stiglitz (2002) Globalisation and Its Discontents (London: Allen Lane).  
 
54  Sergio Rizzo & Gian Antonio Stella (2007), La casta (Milano: Rizzoli).  
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precisely such abuses of power and trust quite spectacularly have failed, and one can trace 
these failures to the process of ‘de-regulation’ or light touch regulation that international 
markets required. The significant ‘distance’ between the ruling elites and citizens that 
political science has assumed to be a specific trait of authoritarian countries where a wealthy 
and powerful minority usually rules over a less well-off majority and controls it through 
repressive measures increasingly seems to characterize liberal-democracies as well, with the 
consequent loss of credibility and appeal of liberal-democratic arrangements.  
 Finally, both democracies and liberalized autocracies suffer from the presence of 
systemic structural power, whereby key social groups usually linked to big business and 
international economic interests have a much higher degree of access to policy-makers and 
therefore have the power to influence the strategic direction of policy-making.55 The ability of 
business in general to indicate the policies governments have to follow substantially has 
increased to the detriment in many cases of the achievements that social-democracy had 
obtained in the previous decades.56
                                                          
55  Patrick Bernhagen & Thomas Bräuninger (2005), ‘Structural Power and Public Policy: A 
Signalling Model of Business Lobbying in Democratic Capitalism,’ Political Studies, 53, 
1, pp. 43–64.  
 The political marginalization of many lower social groups 
not only affects democracies, but also it is beginning to affect a number of liberalized 
autocracies countries, such as Syria where, at least in theory, the state still represents workers 
and peasants. The necessity to attract foreign direct investments and to satisfy indigenous 
business elites severely restricts the autonomy of policy-makers and contributes to the 
widespread sentiment that the state’s institutions cannot or will not take into account political 
demands that deviate from a neo-liberal model. What is more, the worldwide crisis of 2008 
did not seem to generate a u-turn in terms of economic policy-making and consequently the 
 
56  Tony Judt (2010), Ill Fares the Land (Penguin Press).  
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political reactions of citizens to it have been the usual combination of resignation, apathy and 
populism. 
 
Conclusion 
The argument about disempowerment of ordinary citizens is not new and it has been a 
constant preoccupation of political theorists dealing both with democratic fatigue and 
authoritarianism. However, the increased globalization of the world economy under capitalist 
structures has heightened the problem of the state’s autonomy and independence, restricting 
the menu of choices for policymakers, be they operating in liberal democracies or liberalized 
autocracies. Within this context it is not surprising that we witness a significant degree of de-
politicization among citizens in both systems, leading them to converge at a point where a 
number of individual rights exist and where the formal institutions of democracies are present, 
but where the important policy decisions are taken in an unaccountable manner by self-
serving political and economic elites. When analysed in the context of post-democratization, 
this leads one to question two assumptions. First of all, there is no certainty about transitions 
from authoritarian rule toward democracy and countries actually can get stuck somewhere on 
a continuum rather than making a progression or regression on a linear path. Second, liberal 
democracy as we know it might not in the end prevail as the system of government of all and 
the simplistic dichotomy of authoritarianism/democracy might no longer be useful in 
categorizing political systems across the globe. The suggestion here is that there is indeed a 
degree of convergence between liberalized autocracies and democracies, but it is one of 
widespread dissatisfaction with current forms of political organizations embodied in the 
phenomenon of de-politicization and its different manifestations. When it comes to the Arab 
world, this has very relevant implications because it forces scholars to look at these regimes in 
a broader perspective, given that the current liberal autocratic arrangements constitute an 
25 
answer to challenges that are shared by all other countries in the international system. This 
undermines the notion of the exceptionalism of the Arab world when it comes to its form of 
political rule.57
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